USMC CAP Web Site Home Page      http://www.capmarine.com/
Subject:  The Changing Face of U.S. Forces

Tim,

I don't know if you are aware of some of the very positive articles starting to emerge about CAPs in Iraq. I coped one such piece below.

It seems like light years ago when I wrote you about our CAP efforts within the 1st Marine Division in 2004.  This article sheds light on how much more of the US forces country-wide in Iraq have adjusted tactics towards CAP-like actvities.  I am still dizzy at how long it has collectively taken senior US commanders to realize the effects which can be achieved through the CAP approach.

We will never forget the hard lessons of war your generation passed to those of us that now defend freedom.  The CAP is alive, US forces are better off because of your efforts nearly two generations ago, and (from the Iraqis I still talk with) the conditions in Iraq are much better today than several years ago.

You, sir, have much to be proud of.

Semper fidelis,
Phil Skuta

LtCol P.C. Skuta, USMC
Joint Staff/J5/War on Terrorism


The changing face of U.S. forces

Taking their cue from the Marines in Vietnam, troops use a new strategy to fight Iraq insurgency

BY SCOTT GARTNER | Scott Gartner is a professor of political science at the University of California, Davis, where he teaches U.S. national security. He is author of the book "Strategic Assessment in War."

November 28, 2007

Although 2007 represents the most deadly year so far for the United States in Iraq, recent military statistics and news reports suggest a decrease in the violence and lethality of the conflict.

Car bombs, suicide bombings and body counts are said to have dropped considerably, while in much of Baghdad residents are moving freely for the first time in two years.

These improvements reflect a variety of factors, such as reduced support for insurgents from Syria and Iran and decreased fighting by a number of Sunni and Shia militias. Another reason, largely unnoticed, is changes in strategy and operations by the U.S. military that reflect learning from previous Iraq and Vietnam failures.

American forces began the occupation focusing on big units in huge bases conducting large-scale operations. The problem was that the enemy rapidly adapted with smaller, cell-size units that the large U.S. units couldn't match in speed and flexibility. As happened during the Vietnam War, the military reacted too slowly to the enemy's shifts, with similarly disastrous results.

But in recent months, U.S. commanders have fundamentally changed the way they employ forces, with innovative and well-thought-out counterinsurgency ideas. U.S. troops are broken into smaller units in more dispersed bases where troops conduct themselves more like police than soldiers.

With a walking-the-beat model, U.S. troops are closer to the Iraqi people, more likely to gather critical intelligence and can be seen by the Iraqi people as a force for stability. The new policy of polite military operations (which might seem like an oxymoron) offers an effective way of gaining Iraqis' trust and support.

This approach draws from a strategy used by the Marines in Vietnam, where it was called a Combined Action Platoon. Small numbers of Marines lived in villages throughout the countryside, working with residents in a combination of social-service and defense-consultant roles, to improve security and living conditions. Were the village attacked, the Marine team could hold off the attackers while calling for air, artillery and troop support. The goal was to deter attacks by making them more costly.

In Vietnam, the program was terminated because by the Army's measure of success - the enemy body count - it was a failure. Since the goal was to deter enemy attacks, of course villages in the program experienced significantly less combat, leading to low numbers of enemy dead.

The Marines chose to evaluate success instead through indicators such as rice growing. Planting rice seed required a significant investment of a village's capital. Villagers would make this investment only if they thought they would be around to harvest their investment. Rice planted thus represented South Vietnamese perceptions of future stability.

The end of the program led to a deep rift between the Marine Corps and Army, which further impeded U.S. efforts in Vietnam. For Iraq, by contrast, the new operational doctrine was jointly developed by the two services and is called "The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual" (published in paperback). It has been touted in appearances (on of all places, the "Daily Show") by Army Lt. Col. John Nagl, who wrote an influential book about Vietnam and Malaya (now part of Malaysia).

In judging the success of the operation, we can take two important lessons from the Vietnam experience. First, unlike larger, mobile units that can project power over a wide area, Combined Action Platoons can protect only those neighborhoods and villagers where they are deployed.

Given the small number of U.S. troops (less than a third of what past counterinsurgency successes suggest are necessary), the United States must also get Iraqi and allied military units to buy into the doctrine.

Second, in looking at the extensive array of statistics and benchmarks, one wonders what is the "rice-growing" indicator of performance for Iraq? U.S. troops should be measuring success through local perceptions of rising safety and stability. For example, children are sent to school only when their parents think conditions are sufficiently safe. Thus, school attendance would be a good measure of perceptions of security by the Iraqi public and effectiveness of the new doctrine.

Strategic assessment in war - the ability to learn, admit failure and adopt new approaches - is one of the most challenging and important tasks for any military. That the Army and Marine Corps are working together to develop innovative operations is a hopeful sign about the U.S. military's prospects, even as it still remains unclear whether any gain in security in Iraq will foster the political and institutional development needed for a long-term favorable outcome.

Scott Gartner is a professor of political science at the University of California, Davis, where he teaches U.S. national security. He is author of the book "Strategic Assessment in War."